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An Introduction to Imperfect Competition
via Bilateral Oligopoly
Alex Dickson∗ Simone Tonin†
March 28, 2018
“It seems impossible to go on with analysing markets under the assumption
of perfect competition. Direct observation of economic activity reveals that mar-
kets are the fields of “giants”, operating simultaneously with a fringe of small
competitors. Even partial analysis has taken this picture of the market when
proposing oligopoly solutions to describe the outcomes of imperfectly competitive
markets. Behind the demand function there is a myriad of “small” price-taking
agents, while the supply side is occupied by few agents appearing as giants, con-
trasting with the dwarfs on the demand side.”
Gabszewicz (2013)
1 Introduction
The study of market power in imperfectly competitive markets has commanded much at-
tention from economists. The workhorse model of industrial organization economists—that
of Cournot competition—takes a partial equilibrium perspective and makes the assump-
tion that only firms have market power. Bilateral oligopoly is a natural generalization of
Cournot competition to consider markets in which both sellers and buyers can have market
power and so behave strategically in manipulating prices to be more favourable to them.
The purpose of this exposition is to introduce the reader to the study of bilateral oligopoly
by leading them through worked examples that illustrate some of the main ideas to emerge
from the literature.
Bilateral oligopoly was first introduced by Gabszewicz and Michel (1997). It consists
of an economy in which there are two commodities and agents have “corner endowments”,
i.e. they are endowed with only one of these two commodities. In a noncooperative game,
agents can then choose the amount of their initial endowment to put up in exchange for
the other commodity. It is often convenient to think of the first of the two commodities
as a consumption good and the second as commodity money (which can be viewed as a
numeraire), in which case the agents endowed with the consumption good are called sellers,
and those endowed with the commodity money are called buyers. Despite the simplicity
of the model, the structure is rich enough to study many interesting phenomena that may
arise in imperfectly competitive economies. A fruitful line of research focuses on testing the
robustness of the partial equilibrium analysis of Cournot oligopolies to general equilibrium
models without production where all agents, sellers and buyers, have market power. For
instance, Bloch and Ghosal (1997) and Bloch and Ferrer (2001a) study agents’ incentives
to create submarkets as the Cournot game suggests that firms could gain market power
by forming smaller submarkets. Dickson and Hartley (2008) and Amir and Bloch (2009)
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focus on the existence of Nash equilibrium and the comparative static properties of the
equilibrium. Dickson (2013a) pays particular attention to the effect of entry of additional
sellers in bilateral oligopoly, comparing the results to the conventional wisdom from the
Cournot model.
The bilateral oligopoly model belongs to the line of research on strategic market games
initiated by the seminal papers of Shubik (1973), Shapley (1976), and Shapley and Shubik
(1977). There are many types of strategic market games (see Giraud (2003) and Levando
(2012) for a survey). Here we mention only the “trading post model” and the “window
model” which can be seen as different institutional mechanisms through which prices are
determined. In the first model, trade is decentralised through a system of trading posts
where commodities are exchanged. Dubey and Shubik (1978) studied the trading post
model where only commodity money is used to buy other commodities while Amir, Sahi,
Shubik, and Yao (1990) considered the case in which any commodity can be used to buy
other commodities.1 Differently, Sahi and Yao (1989) studied the window model where
trade is centralised by a clearing house in which there is a “window” for each commodity.
This model was first proposed informally by Lloyd S. Shapley, and we call it the “Shapley
window model”. It is important to stress that when there are only two commodities, as in
bilateral oligopoly, the three models coincide.
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we provide a unified framework, by means of
non-trivial examples,2 to compare the results obtained in simultaneous-move and sequential-
move versions of bilateral oligopoly with the Cournot model and the Cournot-Walras ap-
proach. We also underline the advantages and disadvantages of each approach and we
survey the main contributions on imperfect competition and strategic market games that
are linked with our analysis. Secondly, we show how the bilateral oligopoly model can
be used to study different kinds of oligopoly: symmetric oligopoly, where all agents act
strategically; asymmetric oligopoly where only some agents act strategically; simultaneous
oligopoly, where sellers and buyers make their choices without knowledge of others’ deci-
sions; and sequential oligopoly, where some agents move first. Thirdly, we focus on how
the bilateral oligopoly model can clarify how either strategic or competitive behaviours
may emerge endogenously depending on the fundamentals of the economy. In other words,
we show how the bilateral oligopoly model can provide “a foundation for perfect compe-
tition” and “a foundation for Cournot oligopoly” in two-commodity exchange economies.
These are research programs whose aim is to define models where perfect competition and
oligopoly are not assumed a priori but they are an equilibrium outcome.3
We start our analysis by recasting the classical Cournot game as an exchange game
where firms are replaced by sellers characterised by initial endowments and utility func-
tions. Next, we consider the Cournot-Walras equilibrium concept in exchange economies,
introduced by Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991) and Gabszewicz and Michel (1997). This
latter model describes, in a general equilibrium framework, the same kind of imperfect
competition as the Cournot game. The exchange versions of these cornerstone models to
study imperfect competition allow us to compare them with the bilateral oligopoly model
in a clear way. In fact all examples in the paper are based on the same exchange econ-
omy where sellers have quasi–linear utility functions and buyers have quadratic utility
functions that generate a linear demand. By comparing the different approaches we find
that there are three main differences between the Cournot-Walras approach and the bilat-
eral oligopoly model. First, the latter model, with a finite number of agents, describes a
1A strategic market game with trading post and fiat money was considered by Peck, Shell, and Spear
(1992).
2Dickson (2013b) shows that examples with Cobb-Douglas utility functions, very common in the litera-
ture, have very peculiar features which do not hold in general.
3See Gale (2000) for a discussion on why the study of foundations is important.
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symmetric oligopoly, since all agents are allowed to act strategically, whereas the Cournot-
Walras approach describes an asymmetric oligopoly where only the sellers are allowed to
act strategically—they can manipulate prices by changing their actions— while the buyers
are assumed to treat prices as given and beyond their control. Second, the Cournot-Walras
approach has an intrinsic two-stage nature which cannot be reconciled with the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium of simultaneous-move bilateral oligopoly where all agents act together. In
order to capture the two-stage structure considered in Cournot-Walras, we define a sequen-
tial bilateral oligopoly, where sellers move in the first stage and buyers move in the second
stage, and we adopt a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium as the equilibrium concept. Third,
in bilateral oligopoly all agents are treated symmetrically and no a priori assumption is
made on agents’ behaviour while in Cournot-Walras sellers are assumed to act strategically
and buyers are assumed to behaved competitively. Okuno, Postwaite and Roberts (1981)
stressed the fact that in those kind of models no explanation is given as to why a particular
agent should behave strategically rather than competitively.
A natural question to ask is whether it is possible to use the bilateral oligopoly model
to study an asymmetric oligopoly where no assumptions on agents’ behaviours are made.
This is the so-called problem of the “foundations of oligopoly”. We answer positively to
that question by showing how a partial replica of the exchange economy –we replicate only
buyers– can be used to obtain different agents’ behaviours endogenously. In fact, even if all
agents have a priori the same strategic position, at the limit of the partial replica sellers turn
out to have influence on prices whereas buyers turn out to be competitive. This is due to the
fact that buyers lose their ability to influence prices when their number increases. We also
show an example where, when only buyers are replicated, sellers’ and buyers’ commodity
bundles at the limit of the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of a sequential-move game
in which the sellers move first are the same commodity bundles at the Cournot-Walras
equilibrium. Therefore, we conclude that the bilateral oligopoly model is useful to study
asymmetric oligopoly by using the partial replica. Furthermore, the partial replica in the
sequential bilateral oligopoly can provide a foundation of the Cournot-Walras approach.
In the last part of our paper, we study the relationship among the Walras (competitive)
equilibrium and the other equilibrium concepts examined. To this end, we show an exam-
ple where, when all agents in the economy are replicated, sellers’ and buyers’ commodity
bundles at the limit of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium correspond to the commodity bundles
at the Walras equilibrium. This is not surprising because, as in the partial replica, when
an agent is replicated they lose market power and in the limit he behaves competitively.
Since all agents are replicated, in the limit everyone behaves competitively and then the
equilibrium outcome must be Walrasian. Therefore, the bilateral oligopoly model can be
used to study the foundations of perfect competition as competitive behaviours can be
obtained endogenously in equilibrium.
We conclude our analysis by making some welfare considerations on the different types
of competition analysed. By the First Welfare Theorem, the Walras equilibrium is Pareto
efficient while the allocations obtained with the other equilibrium concepts are Pareto
inefficient. This can easily be seen because there exists an allocation that Pareto dominates
the one obtained at any equilibrium different from the Walras equilibrium. In other words,
when markets are imperfectly competitive the equilibrium outcome is Pareto inefficient.
The rest of the paper has the following structure. In Section 2 we introduce the Cournot
exchange game. In Section 3 we describe the Cournot-Walras approach. In Section 4 after
having defined the simultaneous bilateral oligopoly model and the Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium, we give an example with a finite number of agents and an example where we partially
replicate the exchange economy concluding there may be differences between a simultane-
ous bilateral oligopoly and the Cournot-Walras approach even when the number of buyers
is large. In Section 5 we introduce the sequential bilateral oligopoly model, we partially
3
replicate the exchange economy, and we compare the limit of the subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium with the Cournot-Walras equilibrium. In Section 6 we compare our previous
results with the Walras equilibrium and we make some welfare considerations. In section 7
we draw some conclusions and we outline some open problems.
2 Cournot exchange game (partial analysis)
“Let us now imagine two proprietors and two springs of which the qualities
are identical, and which, on account of their similar positions, supply the same
market in competition.”
A. A. Cournot (1838)
In this section, by taking a slightly different approach from the one proposed by Cournot
(1838), we consider the two proprietors as sellers of water and not as producers. This means
that they are characterised by utility functions instead of cost functions. The interpretation,
however, is very similar: supplying some of the good to the market reduces the seller’s
holdings of it that provides some disutility, i.e. a cost. The consumption good (water in
Cournot’s example) is denoted by x and it is exchanged for money which is denoted by
y.4 A commodity bundle (x, y) is a point in R2+ which is the set of all feasible commodity
bundles. As in Cournot (1838), we assume that buyers are represented by the demand for
the consumption good which is a downward sloping function of the price, i.e., D = f(px).
Each seller is characterised by a utility function, ui : R
2
+ → R, which represents their
preferences, and by an initial endowment, (x0i , y
0
i ) ∈ R2+, such that x0i > 0 and y0i = 0, i.e.,
sellers hold only the consumption good. Sellers face the demand and we assume that they
choose a supply of the consumption good in order to obtain a commodity bundle which
maximises their utility. We suppose that there are m sellers.
We now introduce the Cournot exchange game Γ. The strategy set of seller i is
Qi = {qi ∈ R : 0 ≤ qi ≤ x0i }, (1)
with qi the offer of the consumption good that seller i puts up in exchange for money. Let
Q =∏mi=1Qi andQ−h =∏i 6=hQi. Let q = (q1, . . . , qm) and q−i = (q1, . . . , qi−1, qi+1, . . . , qm)
be elements of Q and Q−i respectively. We denote by Q =
∑m
i=1 qi the total amount of
the consumption good sold by sellers. We assume that the market for the consumption
good clears, which means that the total supply is equal to the demand. Therefore, for each
q ∈ Q, the price of the consumption good is px(q) = f−1(Q) which implies D = Q and py is
normalized to 1. For each q ∈ Q, the commodity bundle (xi(q), yi(q)) of a seller i is given
by
xi(q) = x
0
i − qi,
yi(q) = px(q) · qi,
(2)
for i = 1, . . . ,m. The payoff function of a seller i is
πi(q) = ui(xi(q), yi(q)), (3)
for i = 1, . . . ,m. A Cournot exchange game is then a set Γ = {(Qi, πi(·))mi=1}. We now
introduce the definition of a Cournot equilibrium.
Definition 1. The strategy profile qˆ is a Cournot equilibrium for the game Γ if for each
seller i = 1, . . . ,m we have πi(qˆi, qˆ−i) ≥ πi(qi, qˆ−i), for each qi ∈ Qi.
4Commodity y should be called commodity money because it enters in the utility function. However, for
simplicity, we simply refer to it as money.
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We now consider an example to illustrate the Cournot equilibrium concept.
Example 1. Consider a market with two sellers such that ui(x, y) = log(1 + x) + y and
(x0i , y
0
i ) = (3, 0), for i = 1, 2. Buyers are represented by the demand function D = 6− 2px.
Since we assume that the market for the consumption good clears, D = q1 + q2, we obtain
px(q) = 3 − 12(q1 + q2). To find the Cournot equilibrium we need to find the strategies
qˆ1 and qˆ2 which maximise the sellers’ payoffs. Consider, without loss of generality, the
maximization problem for seller 1
max
q1
log(1 + (3− q1)) +
(
3− 1
2
(q1 + q2)
)
q1,
subject to 0 ≤ q1 ≤ 3.
(4)
This payoff function is strictly concave in q1, and an easy way to find the maximum is to
solve the problem as an unconstrained maximisation problem then check the constraints
are satisfied. The first-order condition is
∂π1
∂q1
: − 1
4− q1 + 3− q1 −
q2
2
= 0.
Since sellers are identical, we consider the symmetric Cournot equilibrium where qˆ1 = qˆ2.
We then find the following Cournot equilibrium
(qˆ1, qˆ2) =
(
9−√15
3
,
9−√15
3
)
.
At the Cournot equilibrium the price is px(qˆ) =
√
15
3 , demand for the consumption good is
D = 18−2
√
15
3 and the sellers’ commodity bundles are
(xi(qˆ), yi(qˆ)) =
(√
15
3
,
3
√
15− 5
3
)
, for i = 1, 2.
While we consider a slight variation on the original Cournot model as we treat firms as
sellers with utility functions, the underlying principles are exactly the same. Shubik (1973)
raised the following critique to this type of oligopoly model:
“The Cournot duopoly model is an open market model involving money.
After trade has taken place neither the amount of goods nor the amount of
money in the system is conserved. Goods flow out into the market and money
flows in from the market.”
Shubik’s paper advocates a closed market model, where commodities flow within the
system and after trade the total amount of each commodity does not change. In our example
due to our treatment of the sellers the amount of the consumption good is preserved, but
it is immediate to see that the final amount of money is coming from outside the model.
This is a typical feature of partial equilibrium models where each market is considered in
isolation from the rest of the economy. Therefore, M. Shubik is suggesting to study oligopoly
within a general equilibrium model. Furthermore, another critical feature of the Cournot
exchange game is that agents are modelled in different ways: sellers are represented by
utility functions and initial endowments while buyers are represented by a demand function.
In the next section we address these two issues by introducing a two-commodity ex-
change economy with corner initial endowments and by using the Cournot-Walras equilib-
rium as solution concept.
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3 Cournot-Walras approach
We start by defining the buyers who have been represented by a demand function in the
previous model. A buyer is characterised by a utility function ui : R
2
+ → R which represents
their preferences and by an initial endowment, (x0i , y
0
i ) ∈ R2+, such that x0i = 0 and y0i > 0,
i.e., buyers hold only money. We suppose that there are n buyers in the exchange economy
indexed i = m + 1, . . . ,m + n. The difference between sellers and buyers in this model
lies in the initial endowments: sellers hold only the consumption good while buyers hold
only money. We can now formally define an exchange economy E = {(ui(·), (x0i , y0i ))m+ni=1 }
which is the set containing all the pairs (ui(·), (x0i , y0i )) describing sellers and buyers. In
two-commodity exchange economies the price vector is simply p = (px, py).
We now describe the agents’ behaviours in the Cournot-Walras approach. In the
Cournot game sellers were permitted to act strategically while the buyers behind the de-
mand function are implicitly assumed to act as price takers. The Cournot-Walras approach
preserves this asymmetry but derives the Walrasian (competitive) demands of the buyers
from their characteristics. The Walrasian demands of a buyer i are the functions xi(p) and
yi(p) that associate to each positive price vector an amount of commodity x and y that
maximises the utility function ui(·) in i’s budget set {(x, y) ∈ R2+ : pxx+ pyy ≤ pyy0i }.5 In
other words, for any positive price vector p, the amounts xi(p) and yi(p) solve the following
maximization problem6
max
(x,y)∈R2
+
ui(x, y),
subject to pxx+ pyy ≤ pyy0i ,
for any buyer i. We assume again that the market of each commodity clears. Therefore,
for each q ∈ Q, the price vector p at a Cournot-Walras equilibrium must solve
m+n∑
i=m+1
xi(p) =
m∑
i=1
qi, (5)
i.e., buyers’ total demand of the consumption good must be equal to sellers’ total supply of
the consumption good. We denote by p(q) the price vector (px(q), 1) that solves equation
(5).7 If equation (5) holds then the market for money also clears. By having described the
price formation rule, which is purely Walrasian, we can now define the rules to calculate
the commodity bundle of each agent. The buyers’ commodity bundles are given by the
Walrasian demands calculated at the price vector p(q). Differently, since sellers’ strategies
are the same of the Cournot exchange game, their commodity bundles are given according
to the equations in (2) at the price vector p(q). Consequently sellers’ payoff functions are
defined as in (3). We finally introduce the notion of an allocation (xi, yi)
n+m
i=1 which is a
specification of a commodity bundle for each seller and buyer.
We now have all the elements to define the Cournot-Walras equilibrium for the exchange
economy E .
Definition 2. A Cournot-Walras equilibrium for the exchange economy E is a vector q˜ and
an allocation (x˜i, y˜i)
n+m
i=1 such that
- for each seller i = 1, . . . ,m we have ui(xi(q˜i, q˜−i), yi(q˜i, q˜−i)) ≥ ui(xi(qi, q˜−i), yi(qi, q˜−i)),
for each qi ∈ Qi;
5More generally, Walrasian demands can be correspondences which associate to each price the set of
commodity bundles which maximise the utility function in the budget set. For the sake of simplicity, we
just consider the case in which Walrasian demands are functions.
6Note that this maximisation problem has a solution only for continuous utility functions and positive
prices (see Varian (1992) p. 98).
7To avoid cumbersome notation, but without confusion, in the paper we denote the same elements of
different models with the same symbol.
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- (x˜i, y˜i) = (xi(q˜), yi(q˜)) for the sellers i = 1, . . . ,m and (x˜i, y˜i) = (xi(p(q˜)), yi(p(q˜)))
for the buyers i = m+ 1, . . . , n.
We now consider an example to illustrate the Cournot-Walras equilibrium concept.
Example 2. Consider an exchange economy with 2 sellers and 2 buyers such that ui(x, y) =
ln(1+x)+y and (x0i , y
0
i ) = (3, 0), for i = 1, 2, and ui(x, y) = 3x− 12x2+y and (x0i , y0i ) = (0, 5),
for i = 3, 4. To calculate a Cournot-Walras equilibrium, the first step is to finding buyers’
Walrasian demands. We then solve the constrained maximization problem
max
(x,y)∈R2
+
3x− 1
2
x2 + y,
subject to pxx+ pyy ≤ py5,
for both buyers. By using the Lagrange multiplier method, we can obtain the Walrasian
demands
xi(p) = 3− px
py
,
yi(p) =
5p2y + p
2
x − 3pxpy
p2y
,
for i = 3, 4. Study of the second-order conditions reveals the solution corresponds to a
maximum.8 Since we normalise py = 1, the price of the consumption good which solves
equation (5) is
px(q) = 3− 1
2
(q1 + q2).
By construction, this is the same inverse demand function as in Example 1, but derived
from buyers’ characteristics rather than assumed. Therefore, it is immediate to see that
sellers’ maximisation problem is equivalent to the maximisation problem (4) in Example
1, so (q˜1, q˜2) = (
9−√15
3 ,
9−√15
3 ) and p(q˜) = (
√
15
3 , 1). Finally, the allocation at the Cournot-
Walras equilibrium is
(xi(q˜), yi(q˜)) =
(√
15
3
,
3
√
15− 5
3
)
, for i = 1, 2,
(xi(p(q˜)), yi(p(q˜))) =
(
9−√15
3
,
20− 3√15
3
)
, for i = 3, 4.
It is immediate to see that sellers’ commodity bundles and the total demand of the
consumption good from buyers correspond to the ones at the Cournot equilibrium. There-
fore, the Cournot-Walras equilibrium captures, in a general equilibrium framework, the
same kind of competition as the Cournot exchange game but where the total quantities
of the two commodities in the system are preserved. In other words, the Cournot-Walras
approach allows us to study asymmetric oligopoly in a general equilibrium setting, with
sellers acting strategically and buyers assumed to treat prices as fixed. Therefore, oligopoly
models based on exchange economies can address Shubik (1973)’s critique.
The Cournot-Walras equilibrium concept was introduced by Gabszewicz and Vial (1972)
in a production economy and it was recast in exchange economies by Codognato and Gab-
szewicz (1991) and subsequently by Gabszewicz and Michel (1997). These contributions
8It is worth noting that, since the utility functions are quasi-linear, there can be corner solutions. How-
ever, for the sake of simplicity and since this does not affect our analysis, we just consider interior solutions.
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consider exchange economies characterised by few oligopolists (sellers in our case) and
many small agents (buyers in our case). Furthermore, following the Cournotian spirit, the
oligopolists are allowed to act strategically as they are few, while small agents are assumed
to act competitively as price takers as they are many. However this kind of assumption was
criticised by Okuno, Postlewaite and Roberts (1980):
“Traditional general equilibrium treatments of such situations [in which some
but not all agents have market power] have been deficient in that they have
simply assumed a priori that certain agents behave as price takers while others
act non-competitively, with no formal explanation being given as to why a
particular agent should behave one way or the other.”
Our Example 2 supports this view as it shows that it is possible to use the Cournot-
Walras equilibrium in odd cases where buyers are assumed to behave competitively even if
there are only two of them. In other words, the Cournot-Walras approach does not endoge-
nously derive agents’ behaviours but it assumes a priori that some agents can influence
prices while others are price takers. Another shortcoming of the Cournot-Walras approach
is that it is extremely challenging to obtain a general existence result because oligopolists in-
fluence prices by manipulating the Walras price correspondence which may fail to be contin-
uous unless strict assumptions are imposed on the set of price-taking agents. Nevertheless,
some existence results have been obtained in particular frameworks: Bonisseau and Florig
(2003) prove the existence of a Cournot-Walras equilibrium in linear exchange economies;
and Codognato and Julien (2013) proved the existence in mixed exchange economies where
agents on the continuum have Cobb-Douglas utility functions.9
The issue of asymmetrically imposing behavioural assumptions on some agents is over-
come in bilateral oligopoly models in which both sellers and buyers are treated symmet-
rically in that all agents are allowed to behave strategically—no price-taking assumptions
are imposed a priori—and departing from the Walrasian tradition the price is constructed
from agents strategic decisions.
4 Simultaneous bilateral oligopoly
As stressed in the introduction, the bilateral oligopoly model is a strategic market game
based on a two-commodity exchange economy with corner initial endowments.10 We define
the exchange economy as E = {(ui(·), (x0i , y0i ))m+ni=1 } as in the previous section. The strategy
set of a seller i is defined as in (1). The strategy set of a buyer i is
Bi = {bi ∈ R : 0 ≤ bi ≤ y0i }.
bi is the bid of money that buyer i makes on the consumption good. Let B = ∏m+ni=1 Bi
and B−h =
∏
i 6=h Bi. Let b = (bm+1, . . . , bm+n) and b−i = (bm+1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bm+n)
be elements of B and B−i respectively. For each (q, b) ∈ Q × B, the price vector p(q, b) =
(px(q, b), 1) is determined such that the price of the consumption good is given by the ratio
of the total money bids made for the good to the total amount of good made available by
the sellers:
px(q, b) =
{
B
Q
if Q 6= 0
0 if Q = 0
, (6)
with B =
∑n
i=m+1 b
i. By having defined the price formation rule, which is non-Walrasian,
we can now define the rules to calculate the commodity bundles of each agent. For each
9Shirai (2010) prove the existence of a Cournot-Walras equilibrium in production economies.
10Bloch and Ferrer (2001a) and Dickson and Hartley (2013b) also consider the case in which agents are
endowed with both commodities, i.e. have “interior” initial endowments, and can choose whether they
become sellers or buyers.
8
(q, b) ∈ Q × B, the commodity bundle (xi(q, b), yi(q, b)) of each seller i = 1, . . . ,m is given
by
xi(q, b) = x
0
i − qi,
yi(q, b) = px(q, b) · qi,
(7)
and the commodity bundle (xi(q, b), yi(q, b)) of each buyer i = m+1, . . . ,m+n is given by
xi(q, b) =
bi
px(q, b)
,
yi(q, b) = y
0
i − bi.
As such, each agent’s amount of the commodity they are endowed with reduces by the
quantity of that commodity they offer to the market, and the amount of the other com-
modity is given by their proportional share of the aggregate amount of that commodity
offered by the other side of the market, so sellers receive a share qi/Q of the aggregate bid
B, and buyers receive a share bi/B or the aggregate offer Q. The payoff function of agent i
is πi(q, b) = ui(xi(q, b), yi(q, b)), for i = 1, . . . ,m+ n. The simultaneous bilateral oligopoly
model is then a set Γ′ = {(Qi, πi(·))mi=1, (Bi, πi(·))m+ni=m+1}.
The definition of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium is as follows.
Definition 3. The strategy profile (qˆ, bˆ) is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the game Γ′ if
for each seller i = 1, . . . ,m we have πi(qˆi, qˆ−i, bˆ) ≥ πi(qi, qˆ−i, bˆ), for each qi ∈ Qi, and for
each buyer i = m+ 1, . . . ,m+ n we have πi(qˆ, bˆi, bˆ−i) ≥ πi(qˆ, bi, bˆ−i), for each bi ∈ Bi.
We now consider an example to illustrate the Cournot-Nash equilibrium concept.
Example 3. Consider the exchange economy defined in Example 2. To find the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium, we have to solve the payoff maximization problems for all agents. We
first consider sellers and then buyers. Consider the maximisation problem of seller 1:
max
q1
ln(1 + (3− q1)) + b3 + b4
q1 + q2
q1,
subject to 0 ≤ q1 ≤ 3.
This payoff function is concave in q1; we solve as an unconstrained problem then check the
solution satisfies the constraints. The first-order condition is
∂π1
∂q1
: − 1
4− q1 +
b3 + b4
q1 + q2
(
1− q1
q1 + q2
)
= 0.
Since all sellers are identical and all buyers are identical, we consider a symmetric Cournot-
Nash equilibrium where qˆ1 = qˆ2 and bˆ3 = bˆ4. Then the previous equation becomes,
∂π1
∂q1
: − 1
4− q1 +
bˆ3
qˆ1
1
2
= 0,
and we obtain
qˆ1 =
4bˆ3
2 + bˆ3
. (8)
Consider next the maximisation problem of buyer 3:
max
b3
3b3
q1 + q2
b3 + b4
− 1
2
(
b3
q1 + q2
b3 + b4
)2
+ (5− b3),
subject to 0 ≤ b3 ≤ 5.
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Again this is concave in own strategy and we solve by considering the unconstrained max-
imisation problem. The first-order condition is
∂π3
∂b3
:
q1 + q2
b3 + b4
(
1− b3
b3 + b4
)(
3− b3 q1 + q2
b3 + b4
)
− 1 = 0.
Since we consider the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium, we then obtain
bˆ3 = qˆ1
1
2
(3− qˆ1). (9)
By combining equations (8) and (9), we find that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the
bilateral oligopoly model is
(qˆ1, qˆ2, bˆ3, bˆ4) =
(
7−√17
2
,
7−√17
2
,
√
17− 3,
√
17− 3
)
.
At the Cournot-Nash equilibrium the price vector is p(qˆ, bˆ) = (
√
17−1
4 , 1) and the allocation
is
(xi(qˆ, bˆ), yi(qˆ, bˆ)) =
(√
17− 1
2
,
√
17− 3
)
, for i = 1, 2,
(xi(qˆ, bˆ), yi(qˆ, bˆ)) =
(
7−√17
2
, 8−
√
17
)
, for i = 3, 4.
This example clarifies that the simultaneous bilateral oligopoly model allows us to study
oligopoly where all agents are treated symmetrically and no assumptions on their behaviours
are made a priori. Indeed, given the structure of the game, all agents act strategically be-
cause they can manipulate the price by changing their actions. Therefore bilateral oligopoly
addresses the critique raised by Okuno et al. (1980). The fact that buyers act strategically
is one of the reasons why sellers’ and buyers’ commodity bundles at the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium are different from those obtained at the Cournot-Walras equilibrium, even if
the exchange economies in Examples 2 and 3 are the same. We stress again that buyers
are assumed to behave as price-takers in the Cournot-Walras approach while they are per-
mitted to act strategically in bilateral oligopoly. Furthermore, while the Cournot-Walras
model suffers from issues because of the potential discontinuity of the Walras price corre-
spondence, this is not the case in bilateral oligopoly because the price formation rule is
non-Walrasian. The existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium was studied by Bloch and
Ferrer (2001a) and Dickson and Hartley (2008), who also studied uniqueness of equilib-
rium. Additionally, Bloch and Ferrer (2001b) showed the existence when all agents have a
constant elasticity of substitution utility function.
At this point of the analysis a natural question arises: is it possible to employ the
bilateral oligopoly model to study asymmetric oligopoly where no a priori assumptions on
agents behaviours are made? In other words, is it possible to develop a framework where
the differences in agents’ behaviours arise endogenously in equilibrium? This is also known
as the problem of providing a strategic foundation for oligopoly.
In the literature, two main approaches are used to this end. The first approach consists
in using mixed exchange economies where large agents (oligopolists) are represented by
atoms and small agents (competitive agents) by an atomless continuum. An atom is an
agent whose initial endowment is non-negligible compared to the total endowment of the
economy while a agent in the continuum holds only a negligible part of it. The model
was proposed by Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971) and Shitovitz (1973) in cooperative game
theory. Shitovitz (1973) stated:
10
“The main point in our treatment is that the small and the large traders
are not segregated into different groups a priori; they are treated on exactly the
same basis. The distinctions we have found between them are an outcome of
the analysis; they have not been artificially introduced in the beginning, as is
the case in the classical approach.”
This approach based on mixed exchange economies was also extended to noncooperative
game theory by Okuno et al. (1980), in order to address their critique, and further gener-
alised by Busetto, Codognato, and Ghosal (2011) and Busetto, Codognato, Ghosal, Julien,
and Tonin (2017). In this setting, while all agents have a priori the same strategic position,
they found that in equilibrium large agents represented by atoms have market power while
small agents on the continuum behave as if they are price-takers.
The second approach is based on considering partial replicas of exchange economies
where the number of some agents is increased while proportionally reducing their weights.
This method was introduce by Dre`ze, Gabszewicz, and Gepts (1969) in cooperative game
theory and it was adapted to bilateral oligopoly by Dickson and Hartley (2013). The main
result of this approach is that agents who are replicated lose their ability to influence the
prices and at the limit they behave competitively whereas the others keep market power.
In the last part of the section, we consider this second approach and we study the limit
of a partial replica where we replicate only the set of buyers. We study such limit because
it represents an asymmetric oligopoly where buyers are asymptotically negligible and so
should behave as price-takers. Consider an exchange economy E = {(ui(·), (x0i , y0i ))m+ni=1 }
where the first m agents are sellers and all other n agents are buyers. We associate to each
buyer a weight 1
n
which is used to scale their initial endowment when compared to the
whole economy. Therefore, the total initial endowment of money is give by
∑m+n
i=m+1
1
n
y0i .
When n increases, the number of buyers increases but the total initial endowment of money
remains the same as in the initial economy. Given the price formation rule (6) and since
B =
∑m+n
i=m+1
1
n
bi, if n increases, then the buyers’ ability to influence prices decreases and
at the limit, for n → ∞, totally disappears. It is important to stress that the limit of
a sequence of Cournot-Nash equilibria, which is denoted by (q¯, b¯), is not a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium of the limit economy as the underlying game in the limit is not well-defined.
Nevertheless, the limit of the sequence gives us an object that can be compared to the other
solution concepts in finite economies.
We now consider an example to illustrate how to partially replicate an exchange economy
and how to calculate its limit.
Example 4. Consider an exchange economy with 2 sellers and 2n buyers such that ui(x, y) =
ln(1+x)+y and (x0i , y
0
i ) = (3, 0), for i = 1, 2, and ui(x, y) = 3x− 12x2+y and (x0i , y0i ) = (0, 5),
for i = 3, . . . , 2n+2. As such, it is as if there are n copies of both the buyers 3 and 4 defined
in Example 2. To each buyer is associated a weight 1
n
and then B =
∑2n+2
i=3
1
n
bi. To simplify
the analysis, we consider a symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium, where all buyers play the
same strategy, and then Bˆ = 2bˆi. But then, if we consider the sellers’ payoff maximisation
problems, it is straightforward to verify that sellers’ best responses are as in the previous
example
qˆi =
4bˆ3
2 + bˆ3
, (10)
for i = 1, 2. On the contrary, buyers’ maximisation problems are different from the previous
example because now there are 2n buyers instead of two. Consider the maximisation
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problem of a typical buyer 3:
max
b3
3b3
q1 + q2
1
n
b3 +
∑2n+2
i=4
1
n
bi
− 1
2
(
b3
q1 + q2
1
n
b3 +
∑2n+2
i=4
1
n
bi
)2
+ (5− b3),
subject to 0 ≤ b3 ≤ 5.
(11)
To simplify the notation, let B−3 =
∑2n+2
i=4
1
n
bi. The first order condition of the buyer’s
unconstrained maximisation problem can be written as
∂π3
∂b3
:
q1 + q2
1
n
b3 +B−3
(
1−
1
n
b3
1
n
b3 +B−3
)(
3− b3 q1 + q21
n
b3 +B−3
)
− 1 = 0. (12)
Since we consider a symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium where qˆ1 = qˆ2 and bˆ3 = · · · =
bˆ2n+2, from the previous equation we obtain
bˆ3 = qˆ1
(
1− 1
2n
)
(3− qˆ1). (13)
Let k = 1 − 12n . By combining equations (10) and (13), we obtain the following Cournot-
Nash equilibrium for the bilateral oligopoly model
(qˆ1, qˆ2, bˆ3, . . . , bˆ2n+2) =
(
7k −√k2 + 8k
2k
,
7k −√k2 + 8k
2k
,
2
√
k2 + 8k − 2k − 2, . . . , 2
√
k2 + 8k − 2k − 2
)
The limit of this Cournot-Nash equilibrium for n → ∞ is q¯i = 2 for sellers and b¯i = 2
for buyers. At the limit the price vector is p(q¯, b¯) = (1, 1) and the sellers’ and buyers’
commodity bundles are
(xi(q¯, b¯), yi(q¯, b¯)) = (1, 2), for a seller i,
(xi(q¯, b¯), yi(q¯, b¯)) = (2, 3), for a buyer i.
It is immediate to see that the commodity bundles at the limit of the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium are different from the ones at the Cournot-Walras equilibrium of Example 2.
This result is somewhat surprising as at the limit of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium buyers
have no influence on the price, as is assumed in the Cournot-Walras approach, yet the
equilibrium allocations differ. This is due to the fact that the Cournot-Walras approach
has an intrinsic two-stage structure—sellers decide their supply in the first stage taking
as given the Walrasian demands of the buyers—whereas when considering a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium in the bilateral oligopoly model all agents choose their actions simultaneously
so sellers must form beliefs about how the buyers will behave. This fact was stressed by
Dickson and Hartley (2013a) who considered the conditions under which the two models
coincide in the limit, and when they do not. In mixed exchange economies, Codognato
(1995) and Busetto, Codognato, and Ghosal (2008) showed that the allocation at a Cournot-
Walras equilibrium is different from the one at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the Shapley
window model. Therefore, we can conclude that the bilateral oligopoly model can be
useful to study simultaneous asymmetric oligopoly in a closed market model by partially
replicating the underlying exchange economy but it does not provide a foundation of the
Cournot-Walras approach. In the next section, we address this last issue by studying a
sequential bilateral oligopoly model.
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5 Sequential bilateral oligopoly
In this section we consider a sequential-move bilateral oligopoly model with a two-stage
structure where the timing of the model is exogenously specified as follows: in the first stage
sellers simultaneously choose the quantities of the consumption good to put up in exchange
for money; in the second stage buyers simultaneously choose the quantity of money to bid
for the consumption good. At the end of the second stage bids and offers are aggregated
and price is determined according to the usual rule in (6). Groh (1999) first considered
a sequential reformulation of bilateral oligopoly in the context of an example, that was
extended to general settings in Dickson (2006).11
We first consider an exchange economy E = {(ui(·), (x0i , y0i ))m+ni=1 } and we then define
the sequential bilateral oligopoly. The strategy set of a seller i is defined as in (1). The
strategy set of a buyer i is
Bi = {bi(·) is a function such that bi : Q → [0, y0i ]}.
Let B =∏m+ni=1 Bi and b(·) = (bm+1(·), . . . , bm+n(·)) be an element of B. For each (q, b(q)) ∈
Q× B, the price vector p(q, b(q)) = (px(q, b(q)), 1) is such that
px(q, b(q)) =
{
B(q)
Q
if Q 6= 0
0 if Q = 0
, (14)
withB(q) =
∑n
i=m+1 bi(q). For each (q, b(q)) ∈ Q×B, the commodity bundle (xi(q, b(q)), yi(q, b(q)))
of a seller i is given by
xi(q, b(q)) = x
0
i − qi,
yi(q, b(q)) = px(q, b(q)) · qi,
for i = 1, . . . ,m, and the commodity bundle (xi(q, b(q)), yi(q, b(q))) of a buyer i is given by
xi(q, b(q)) =
bi(q)
px(q, b(q))
,
yi(q, b(q)) = y
0
i − bi(q),
for i = m + 1, . . . ,m + n. The payoff function of an agent i is πi(q, b(q)) = ui(xi(q, b(q)),
yi(q, b(q))), for i = 1, . . . ,m + n. The sequential bilateral oligopoly model is then a set
Γ′′ = {(Qi, πi(·))mi=1, (Bi, πi(·))ni=m+1}.
We now define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (hereafter SPNE) which is the
equilibrium concept we use in this dynamic game.
Definition 4. A strategy profile (qˆ, bˆ) is a SPNE for Γ′′ if an only if it is a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium in every subgame of the game Γ′′.
Note that in the sequential bilateral oligopoly the subgames are the whole game and the
subgame in which buyers choose their optimal bids following any vector of offers from the
sellers. We now consider an example to illustrate how to find the SPNE and how to find
the limit of a SPNE when we partially replicate the exchange economy. We stress again
that the limit is not a SPNE as the underlying game is not well-defined at the limit.
Example 5. Consider the same exchange economy defined in Example 4. As before, to
simplify the analysis, we consider a symmetric SPNE that can be computed as follows.
We first calculate the optimal buyers’ strategy for any feasible strategies of sellers. This
11Dickson and Hartley (2013) consider a sequential market share game and Busetto et al. (2008) consider
a sequential reformulation of the Shapley window model.
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guarantees to find a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the buyers’ subgame. We then substitute
the optimal buyers’ strategy in the sellers’ payoff functions to determine their reaction
functions given the responses of the buyers, after which we can find mutually consistent
best responses. The strategy profile obtained in such way is a SPNE. Consider a typical
buyer 3. It is immediate to verify that the buyer’s maximisation problem is as in (11).
Therefore the best response of buyer 3 solves the first order condition in (12). Since we
consider a symmetric SPNE where all buyers play the same strategy, equation (12) can be
rewritten as
∂π3
∂b3
:
q1 + q2
2b3(q)
(
1− 1
2n
)(
3− q1 + q2
2
)
− 1 = 0.
We then obtain
b3(q) =
q1 + q2
2
k
(
3− q1 + q2
2
)
, (15)
with k = 1− 12n . Consider next the maximisation problem of seller 1. If we substitute the
strategy b3(q) in the seller’s payoff function we obtain
max
q1
ln(1 + (3− q1)) + 2q1 + q2
2
k
(
3− q1 + q2
2
)
1
q1 + q2
q1,
subject to 0 ≤ q1 ≤ 3.
(16)
The first order condition of the seller’s unconstrained maximisation problem is
∂π1
∂q1
: − 1
4− q1 +
6k − 2kq1 − kq2
2
= 0.
Since we consider a symmetric SPNE where qˆ1 = qˆ2, the previous equation becomes
q1 =
9k −√9k2 + 6k
3k
. (17)
Therefore, by combining equations (15) and (17), we obtain the following SPNE for the
sequential bilateral oligopoly
(qˆ1, qˆ2, bˆ3(qˆ), . . . , bˆ2n+2(qˆ)) =
(
9k −√9k2 + 6k
3k
,
9k −√9k2 + 6k
3k
,
3
√
9k2 + 6k − 3k − 2
3
, . . . ,
3
√
9k2 + 6k − 3k − 2
3
)
.
The limit of the SPNE for n→∞ is q¯i = 9−
√
15
3 for sellers and b¯i(q¯) =
3
√
15−5
3 for buyers.
At the limit the price vector is p(q¯, b¯(q¯)) = (
√
17−1
4 , 1) and the sellers’ and buyers commodity
bundles are
(xi(q¯, b¯(q¯)), yi(q¯, b¯(q¯))) =
(√
17− 1
2
,
√
17− 3
)
, for a seller i,
(xi(q¯, b¯(q¯)), yi(q¯, b¯(q¯)) =
(
7−√17
2
, 8−
√
17
)
, for a buyer i.
It is immediate to see that the commodity bundles at the limit of the SPNE are different
to those at the limit of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in which moves are simultaneous,
but are the same as those at the Cournot-Walras equilibrium. We stress again that in
this framework all agents are treated symmetrically and the different behaviours of sellers
14
and buyers are obtained endogenously at the limit of the SPNE. With this last example,
we have shown that sequential bilateral oligopoly in which it is exogenously specified that
sellers move first and buyers move second can provide a closed market model to study
sequential asymmetric oligopoly by partially replicating the underlying exchange economy.
Furthermore this model can provide a foundation for the Cournot-Walras approach. It is
worth stressing that the price equation (14) in the limit, when n → ∞, corresponds to
the inverse demand function in Example 1. In mixed exchange economies, Busetto et al.
(2008) showed that the set of the Cournot-Walras equilibrium allocations coincides with a
particular subset of SPNE allocations of the two-stage reformulation of the Shapley window
model.
6 Walras equilibrium and welfare
The Walrasian analysis in the synthesis reached in the contributions of Debreu (1959),
Arrow and Hahn (1971) and Mckenzie (2002) crucially relies on the price-taking assump-
tion, i.e., all agents are assumed to behaved competitively. It is then important to study
under which conditions on the fundamentals of an economy agents consider prices as given
endogenously in equilibrium, without making ad hoc assumptions. This is the problem of
providing a strategic foundation for perfect competition, which is similar in spirit to the
problem of finding a foundation for models of oligopoly. In fact, a strategic foundation for
perfect competition can also be provided by considering continuum exchange economies or
replicated exchange economies.12 In cooperative game theory Aumann (1964) provided a
foundation for perfect competition in economies with a continuum of agents by showing an
equivalence result between the core and the Walras allocation. Subsequently, in noncooper-
ative game theory, Dubey and Shapley (1994) and Codognato and Ghosal (2000) considered
strategic market games with a continuum of agents and they show equivalence results be-
tween the Cournot-Nash and Walras allocations. Those results are based on the fact that
when there is a continuum of agents everyone is negligible and cannot influence prices.
The second approach based on replicated exchange economies was pioneered in cooperative
game theory by Edgeworth (1881) and further analysed by Debreu and Scarf (1963). Sub-
sequently, Dubey and Shubik (1978), Sahi and Yao (1989), and Amir et al. (1990) applied
this technique to strategic market games. They show that when all agents in the economy
are replicated the allocation at the limit of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium corresponds to
the allocation at the Walras equilibrium.13 Those results are heuristically based on the fact
that when the number of agents increases their influence on prices decreases and at the
limit totally disappears.14
We now show how the bilateral oligopoly model can be employed to provide a foundation
for perfect competition. Let E = {(ui(·), (x0i , y0i ))m+ni=1 }. We first define a Walras equilibrium
concept.
Definition 5. A Walras equilibrium is pair (p∗, (x∗i , y
∗
i )
n+m
i=1 ) of a price vector and an
allocation such that each commodity bundle (x∗i , y
∗
i ) maximises agent i’s utility function
within his budget set, for i = 1, . . . ,m+n, and all markets clear, i.e.,
∑m+n
i=1 x
∗
i =
∑m+n
i=1 x
0
i
and
∑m+n
i=1 y
∗
i =
∑m+n
i=1 y
0
i .
From the analysis made in Section 4, we can conjecture that if both the number of
sellers and buyers are replicated while proportionally reducing their weights, all agents lose
12These different approaches are illustrated by the distinction between limit theorems and theorems in
the limit (see Gale 2000). See Mas-Colell (1982) for a study on the links between the two approaches.
13Note that when all agents in the economy are replicated it is not necessary to decrease their weight.
14Mas-Colell (1980) surveyed the main contributions on the foundations of perfect competition by con-
sidering other noncooperative approaches that do not rely on strategic market games.
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market power and the sellers’ and buyers’ commodity bundles at the limit of the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium will correspond to ones at the Walras equilibrium. We now consider an
example to illustrate this point.
Example 6. Consider an exchange economy with 2n sellers and 2n buyers such that
ui(x, y) = ln(1 + x) + y and (x
0
i , y
0
i ) = (3, 0), for i = 1, . . . , 2n, and ui(x, y) = 3x− 12x2 + y
and (x0i , y
0
i ) = (0, 5), for i = 2n + 1, . . . , 4n. It is basically as the exchange economy
defined in Example 2 with n copies of both sellers 1 and 2 and buyers 3 and 4. The Walras
equilibrium of the exchange economy is15
(p1∗, p2∗) =
(√
5− 1
2
, 1
)
,
(x1∗i , x
2∗
i ) =
(√
5− 1
2
, 2
√
5− 3
)
, for i = 1, . . . , 2n
(x1∗i , x
2∗
i ) =
(
7−√5
2
, 8− 2
√
5
)
, for i = 2n+ 1, . . . , 4n.
We now compute the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. As before, we first consider the maximi-
sation problem of seller 1.
max
q1
ln(1 + (3− q1)) +
∑4n
i=2n+1
1
n
bi
1
n
q1 +
∑2n
i=2
1
n
qi
q1,
subject to 0 ≤ q1 ≤ 3.
The first order condition of the seller’s unconstrained maximisation problem is
∂π1
∂q1
: − 1
4− q1 +
∑4n
i=2n+1
1
n
bi
1
n
q1 +
∑2n
i=2
1
n
qi
(
1− q1
1
n
q1 +
∑2n
i=2
1
n
qi
)
= 0.
Since we consider a symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium where all sellers play the same
strategy, we obtain
qˆ1 =
4bˆ2n+1k
1 + bˆ2n+1k
, (18)
with k = 1− 12n .
Consider now the maximisation problem of buyer 2n + 1.
max
b3
3b2n+1
∑2n
i=1
1
n
qi
1
n
b2n+1 +
∑4n
i=2n+2
1
n
bi
− 1
2
(
b2n+1
∑2n
i=1
1
n
qi
1
n
b2n+1 +
∑4n
i=2n+2
1
n
bi
)2
+ (5− b2n+1),
subject to 0 ≤ b2n+1 ≤ 5.
The first order condition of the buyer’s unconstrained maximisation problem is
∂π2n+1
∂b2n+1
:
∑2n
i=1
1
n
qi
1
n
b2n+1 +
∑4n
i=2n+2
1
n
bi
(
1− b2n+1
1
n
b2n+1 +
∑4n
i=2n+2
1
n
bi
)
(
3− b2n+1
∑2n
i=1
1
n
qi
1
n
b2n+1 +
∑4n
i=2n+2
1
n
bi
)
− 1 = 0.
Since we consider the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium where all buyers play the same
strategy, we finally obtain
bˆ2n+1 = qˆ1k(3− qˆ1). (19)
15It is straightforward to verify that sellers’ and buyers’ commodity bundles are the same for any n.
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By combining equations (18) and (19), we obtain the following Cournot-Nash equilibrium
for the bilateral oligopoly model
(qˆ1, . . . , qˆ2n, bˆ2n+1, . . . , b4n) =
(
7k −√k2 + 4
2k
, . . . ,
7k −√k2 + 4
2k
,
2k
√
k2 + 4− 2k2 − 1
k
, . . . ,
2k
√
k2 + 4− 2k2 − 1
k
)
.
The limit of this Cournot-Nash equilibrium as n → ∞ is q¯i = 7−
√
5
2 for sellers and b¯i =
2
√
5− 3 for buyers. At the limit the price vector is p(q¯, b¯) = (
√
5−1
2 , 1) and the sellers’ and
buyers’ commodity bundles are
(xi(q¯, b¯), yi(q¯, b¯)) =
(√
5− 1
2
, 2
√
5− 3
)
, for a seller i,
(xi(q¯, b¯), yi(q¯, b¯)) =
(
7−√5
2
, 8 − 2
√
5
)
, for a buyer i.
It is immediate to see that the commodity bundles at the limit of the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium correspond to the ones at the Walras equilibrium of the underlying exchange
economy. This example further clarifies that the assumption of competitive behaviour is
justified when there are many of each type of agent.
It is worth noting that this convergence to the Walras equilibrium in terms of com-
modity bundles, when all agents are replicated, is also obtained with the Cournot-Walras
equilibrium and the SPNE. These results, obtained for particular examples, suggest that the
timing of the model is not relevant when considering a foundation for perfect competition.
Lahmandi-Ayed (2001) proved the converge of a Cournot-Walras equilibrium to the Walras
equilibrium in exchange economies. As mentioned above, Dubey and Shubik (1978), Amir
et al. (1990), and Sahi and Yao (1989) studied the converge of a Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium to the Walras equilibrium in strategic market games. Koutsougeras and Meo (2017)
considered the convergence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium for
general sequences of economies whose distribution of characteristics has compact support
by using the model defined by Peck et al. (1992).
We conclude this section by making some welfare considerations on the equilibrium
concepts used throughout the paper. First of all, by the First Welfare Theorem, the Walras
equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Differently, all other allocations found in Examples 2–5 are
Pareto inefficient. In fact, it is possible to find other commodity bundles which Pareto
dominate them. In the following table we report the utility levels of sellers and buyers in
the different examples.
Commodity Bundles Utility levels
sellers buyers sellers buyers
Cournot-Walras (Ex. 2)
(√
15
3
, 3
√
15−5
3
) (
9−
√
15
3
, 20−3
√
15
3
)
3.035 6.460
Cournot-Nash (Ex. 3)
(√
17−1
2
,
√
17− 3
) (
7−
√
17
2
, 8−√17
)
2.064 7.158
Cournot-Nash replica (Ex. 4) (1, 2) (2, 3) 2.693 7.000
SPNE replica (Ex. 5)
(√
15
3
, 3
√
15−5
3
) (
9−
√
15
3
, 20−3
√
15
3
)
3.035 6.460
Walras equilibrium (Ex. 6)
(√
5−1
2
, 2
√
5− 3
) (
7−
√
5
2
, 8− 2√5
)
1.950 7.837
It is interesting to note that at the Walras equilibrium, the only efficient equilibrium, sellers
get the lowest utility while buyers get the highest. Furthermore, sellers get the highest
utility at the Cournot-Walras equilibrium which means that, in our examples, they are
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better off when they face competitive buyers in a sequential oligopoly. We finally remark
that Examples 2–6 belong to the general equilibrium framework while Example 1 is a model
of partial analysis. For this reason the efficiency of that model cannot be evaluated by using
the notion of Pareto efficiency
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have provided a unified framework to compare different equilibrium
concepts to study imperfect competition in exchange economies. We have also clarified
the differences among symmetric, asymmetric, simultaneous, and sequential oligopoly and
analysed the relationships among them in terms of replicated exchange economies and
equilibrium concepts.
By studying our examples we have found some interesting facts. First, we have seen
that the Cournot-Walras equilibrium corresponds to the limit of a SPNE where only buyers
are replicated. Second, we mentioned that when all agents in the exchange economies are
replicated the commodity bundles at the limit of any equilibrium concept correspond to
the ones at the Walras equilibrium. This suggests that when there is perfect competition
the timing of the model is not relevant. We believe that further research should be devoted
on those two issues in order to establish more general results.
It is important to remark that asymmetric oligopoly can be studied by using the partial
replica or by considering mixed exchange economies. This alternative approach was intro-
duced by Okuno et al. (1980) and further scrutinised by Busetto, Codognato, and Ghosal
(2008, 2011, 2017) and Busetto, Codognato, Ghosal, Julien, and Tonin (2017). Further-
more, we have focused on exchange economies because economies with production raise
many theoretical and technical problems (see Hart (1985), Gary-Bobo (1988), Bonanno
(1990) for a survey). To the best of our knowledge, the only contributions on strategic
market games with production are Dubey and Shubik (1977) and Chen, Korpeoglu, and
Spear (2017). Finally, we have restricted our analysis to exchange economies with only
two commodities because in a framework with more commodities the results depend on the
particular type of strategic market game adopted.
We conclude by mentioning that there is a small literature on experiments in bilat-
eral oligopoly whose contributions are Duffy, Matros, and Temzelides (2011) and Barreda-
Tarrazona, Garc´ıa-Gallego, Georgantz´ıs, and Ziros (2015). We expect this line of inquiry
to become more popular in the coming years.
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